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Abstract
We consider the problem of allocating a ﬁnite number of divisible ho-
mogeneous goods to N ≥ 2 individuals, in a way which is both envy-free
and Pareto optimal. Building on Thomson (2005 Games and Economic
Behavior), a new simple mechanism is presented here with the follow-
ing properties: a) the mechanism fully implements the desired divisions,
i.e. for each preference proﬁle the set of equilibrium outcomes coincides
with the set of fair divisions; b) the set of equilibria is a global attractor
for the best-reply dynamics. Thus, players myopically adapting their
strategies settle down in an fair division. The result holds even if mixed
strategies are used.
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11 Introduction
Consider a set of individuals who have to divide a bundle of homogeneous
divisible goods among themselves. A referee, ignorant of the preferences of the
individuals, wants the players to end up in a fair division, deﬁned as a division
which is both envy-free (EF)a n dP a r e t oo p t i m a l( PO). Envy-freeness requires
that nobody prefers somebody else’s share to her own. Pareto optimality
excludes divisions like "everybody gets nothing", which are trivially envy-free
but certainly unappealing. Although alternative deﬁnitions of fairness are
possible, envy-freeness and eﬃciency have played a prominent role in the fair
division literature. The appeal of these properties is probably due to the fact
that, beside being intuitive, they refer to ordinal preferences and they do not
involve interpersonal utility comparisons.
Our fair division problem can be approached in diﬀerent ways; to begin
with, it can be seen as a theoretical implementation problem. One can prove
that under the usual assumptions on preferences (strict monotonicity, conti-
nuity, convexity), the fair division correspondence is non-empty and satisﬁes
monotonicity and (vacously) no-veto power. As a consequence, our correspon-
dence is for example implemented by Maskin’s (1977, 2002) classic game form,
when there are at least 3 players. As widely recognized however, this litera-
ture aims at probing the theoretical bounds of implementation. Indeed, most
mechanisms in this pure implementation literature are aimed at proving the
implementability of classes of rules, rather than at providing a workable solu-
tion to applied problems. As a consequence these mechanisms usually suﬀer
from two practical problems: ﬁrst, it is unlikely that real persons can manage
their large strategy spaces. Second, most of the existing mechanisms are essen-
tially coordination games with multiple equilibria; it is not clear how players
can coordinate on any one of them. We return on this point later on.
Beside the implementation literature there exists another line of research,
which follows a "procedural approach" to the fair division problem. Instead
of formally deﬁning game forms and adopting precise equilibrium concepts,
these contributions give "protocols", mean to lead real claimants to a division.
Results along this line range from evolutions of a divide-and-choose procedure
2by Banach and Knaster, to methods of sequential allocation. For an author-
itative overview see Brams and Taylor (1996). These mechanisms are meant
to be as simple as possible in order to serve concrete cases of division. Most
of them could be formalized as game forms, but their equilibria are not often
investigated. Instead, players are assumed to use safety strategies. There are
of course some reasons for this: a) in many cases, manipulation of the mech-
anisms would be diﬃcult, b) the Nash equilibria are so diﬃcult to calculate
that they don’t seem a good predictor of play, c) the important properties
of safety (minmax) strategies make them an appealing solution concept. To
sum up, on one hand this literature yields mechanisms that are reasonably
manipulation-proof, workable and elegant. On the other, it lacks a full game-
theoretic formalization. More importantly, there is no known procedure in this
literature to yield divisions which are at the same time PO and EF.1
Ideally located between the implementation literature and the procedural
approach, there is the "Divide and Permute" mechanism (Thomson (2005)).
This is a formally deﬁned game form, which implements fair divisions in pure
Nash equilibria (henceforth pNE), and which is also simple enough to be ap-
plied to real cases. However, Divide and Permute suﬀers from some important
drawbacks, which indeed motivate our paper. Before illustrating these lim-
itations, we brieﬂy comment on "simplicity" in mechanism design, which is
Divide and Permute’s most appealing quality.
The issue of simplicity is in mechanism design is controversial because sim-
plicity itself is an elusive concept. However, the existing literature seems to
suggests that Divide and Permute (and so our games) are, in some sense, the
simplest possible ones for the problem in hand. Dutta et al (1995) make it
clear that, to implement Pareto eﬃcient allocations, in equilibrium the mech-
anism must reveal the marginal rates of substitutions among goods. Thus, we
cannot hope to solve our problem without players announcing prices, or some-
thing de facto equivalent. On the other hand, Saijo et al.(1996) suggest four
properties as a deﬁnition of natural (i.e. simple) mechanisms: ﬁnite dimension
(of strategy spaces), feasibility (for any strategy proﬁle, outcomes respect a
budget balance), best response (each player has a best reply against any strat-
1A famous mechanism, due to Brams and Taylor (1995), is for EF only.
3egy proﬁle) and forthrightedness (in equilibrium each players receives what she
announced for herself). The canonic Maskin’s mechanism for example, violates
the ﬁrst conditions, requiring players to announce preference proﬁles. On the
contrary, our mechanisms possess the ﬁrst three properties and essentially the
forth one. Apart from Divide and Permute, there is one other "simple" game
to implement fair allocations, by Saijo et al.(1999). We comment later on this
mechanism; now we illustrate a major shortcoming of this game, limitation
also present in Divide and Permute.
Thomson’s (1999) and Saijo et al.’s (1999) game forms are a good solu-
tion to the problem of complexity, but they suﬀer from the other drawback
common to most implementation literature: being coordination games, these
mechanisms present an equilibrium selection problem. This feature is bound
to emerge whenever one sets about to implement a generically multi-valued
rule. What happens is that, for example, there is one equilibrium for each fair
division. These latter are many and cannot be ranked in the same way by all
players, so it is not clear which one should emerge, if ever. Althugh inavoidable,
this problem must be dealt with. Achieving fair divisions is about enabling
people to agree, so if we posit that our players are able to coordinate, we assume
the problem away rather than solving it. Moreover, the coordination problem
is worsened when the outcome function is discontinuous. As already pointed
out by Postlewaite and Wettstein (1989), discontinuity is highly regrettable in
implementation, because little mistakes on the part of players may imply the
target to be missed by much. It is not clear if the continuity problem can be
solved in game forms implementing EF and POallocations. Up to now, there
a r en om e c h a n i s m sw i t ht h i sp r o p e r t y .
In this paper, the coordination problem is overcome by a learning argu-
ment. In addition to full implementation, we require that the equilibria of a
mechanism be limit points of a dynamic adjustment process. More precisely,
the game form presented here has the following features a) its strategy spaces
and outcome functions are simple in the sense of Saijo et al. (1996); b) it
fully implements the fair division rule in pure strategy Nash equilibria; c) for
a version of perturbed best reply similar to that in Cabrales (1999), its out-
come converge with probability one to an ε-equilibrium. In turn, the set of
4ε-equilibria is a neighborood of the set of fair divisions; thus the limit out-
comes of our game are ε-fair, in a sense to be made precise later on. In a word:
we have implementation of fairness in Nash equilibrium, and dynamic imple-
mentation of ε-fairness in ε-equilibrium. It will ﬁnally be noted that those
mixed-strategy equilibria which produce non-fair divisions are weeded out by
the dynamics.
Recent works (Cabrales 1999, Cabrales and Ponti 2000) ﬁnd some conver-
gence results in classic mechanisms.2 In particular Cabrales (1999) shows that
discrete best reply dynamics, applied to Maskin’s (1977) game form, singles
out stable Nash equilibria. However, as we argued above, these general game
forms are not suitable for concrete fair division problems. Being concerned
with the issue of simplicity, our game seems a better solution to the problem
in hand.
The next Section 2 lays down some notation and states the division problem
in formal terms. Following Thomson (2005), from which this work evidently
draws, Section 3 presents three game forms. The ﬁrst two give respectively EF
and POdivisions. The third one, combination of the previous two, implements
divisions which are at the same time EF and PO. Section 4 deals with the
dynamic properties of this ﬁnal game form and Section 5 concludes.
2 Notation and general setting
We have an endowment of l homogeneous divisible goods, to be divided among
N individuals. No restriction is imposed on N but ﬁniteness. The endowment
is represented by a vector ω ∈ Rl
+. Players have strictly monotonic, continuous,
convex preferences over own bundles of goods, i. e. over vectors z ∈ Rl
+.
Individual preferences are occasionally described with the symbols ºi,w i t h
º representing a proﬁle of preferences. The set of all ºs satisfying strict
monotonicity, continuity, convexity is indicated with R.
2Cabrales (1999) analyzes a slightly modiﬁed version of Maskin’s (1977) game form as
presented by Repullo (1987). Cabrales and Ponti (2000) consider Sjöström (1994) mecha-
nism.
5We deﬁne Z as the set of partitions of ω among the N players:
Z =
n






: Σzi = ω
o
Given a preference proﬁle º∈ R, the set of eﬃcient divisions is deﬁned as:
PO(º)={z ∈ Z : z is Pareto optimal in Z for º}
Instead, envy-free divisions are allocations whereby no player prefers somebody
else’s share to his own:
EF (º)={z ∈ Z : zi ºi zj∀i,j}
Finally, the set of fair divisions is
F (º)=EF (º) ∩ PO(º)
The correspondence F : R → Z is the "fair division rule". It is well known
thatF (º) is non-empty for any º in R.3 It is also easy to show by means
of continuity arguments, that F is generically a proper (non-single valued)
correspondence.
We now cast the fair division problem in the framework of implementation
theory. A game form for our problem is a couple Γ = hS,hi such that: S = ×Si
is some product strategy space, and g is an outcome function g : S → Z.
Preferences over bundles naturally deﬁne preferences over partitions, for which
we use the symbol º again to simplify notation: for x,y ∈ Z we have x ºi y
when xi ºi yi. Preferences over bundles thus deﬁne preferences over divisions
and hence over outcomes of Γ. Given a preference proﬁle, game form Γ then
becomes a properly deﬁned game Γ0 = hS,h,ºi. Consider now the set of
pure Nash equilibria of Γ0, which we indicate with pNE(º) (or simply pNE),
and the corresponding set of equilibrium outcomes g[pNE(º)].G a m e f o r m
Γ fully implements F in pure Nash equilibria when g[pNE(º)] = F(º) for
every º∈ R.
One caveat: the sets EF, PO, F a r ed e p e n d e n to nt h ep r e f e r e n c ep r o ﬁle,
and so is the set pNE for a given a mechanism. For correctness, explicit
3Perhaps Varian (1974) noticed this ﬁrst. For example, a competitive equilibrium where
all player’s bundles have the same value is a fair allocation.
6reference to the preference proﬁle should be maintained. However, all proofs
in this paper will evidently go through whatever the chosen º∈ R.T h i s i s
diﬀerent from saying that the statements are themselves evident, but it spares
us pedantic references to º every time we talk about equilibria. Thus for
example, when we have the term "pNE" in a statement, this actually stands
for "pNE(º)" and the statement will be valid for all º∈ R -which is the kind
of result we need for implementation.
Our problem is twofold. First of all, we want to fully implement the corre-
spondence F in Nash equilibria by some mechanism Γ. Then, we want the set
of equilibria to be an attractor for some dynamics, to be described later on.
3 Viable fair division games
This section presents three game forms implementing respectively envy-free, ef-
ﬁcient and fair divisions. Our mechanisms evidently draw on Thomson (2005);
they are an improvement over this latter because: i) they feature symmetric
strategy spaces ii) their equilibria are learned by myopic players, as shown in
Section 4. Following most of the implementation literature (see e.g. Maskin
et al 2002 and references therein), we consider pure strategies only. This re-
striction is innocuous, as discussed in Section 4.
3.1 Envy freeness: ΓEF
The ﬁr s tg a m ei m p l e m e n t sEF divisions. Like all other games in this paper,
it is a one-shot game. We ﬁrst describe it informally as if it were a sequential
game, to clarify its logic.
Each of the N players suggests an allocation and one of these proposals, say
z, is selected (we see in a moment how). Then, the mechanism enables each
player to choose his favourite share in z, whatever others’ strategies. Thus, in
equilibrium it will be the case that all players receive their favourite shares
in z. More in detail, how is z selected? Beside suggesting an allocation, each
player i names an integer and another player ki 6= i. The integers are fed fed
into a modulo game, and thus select one player (the "winner", w). Then, the
7"reference division" z is the one suggested by the player indicated by winner:
z = zkw. On the other hand, how can players choose any share in zkw?E v e r y
i announces a permutation of the shares (πi); these permutations are then
applied to zkw in any predetermined order, before the resulting allocation is
ﬁnally given out. It is clear that by playing an opportune πi,e v e r yi can to
reshuﬄe the shares in his favour, obtaining his preferred share in zkw.
Note that the winner’s choice of z is limited by the fact that kw 6= w.
Similarly, we must also restrain the choice of kw in selecting the reference
allocation z.4 We do so imposing a punishment on the loosers (so on kw as
well) in case zkw 6= zw. By so doing, it will turn out that in equilibrium each
player can pick any share in any of the proposals {zi}i=1..N,w h i c hi nt u r n
ensures envy-freeness (actually even more).
With a slight abuse of notation, let us write N = {1,2,..N} and deﬁne Π
the set of permutations N → N. A formal description of the game follows.
Game form ΓPO is hS,hi :
Si =( Z × Π × N × N − 1) ∀i so si =( zi,πi,n i,k i).













The idea of eliminating envy via permutations is borrowed from "Divide
and Permute" (Thomson (2005)). There however, only two players suggest
divisions, while all others play permutations. In our games, N proposals in-
stead of two may seem somewhat redundant. However, equal strategy spaces
seem more appropriate for an (ex ante) equal treatment of players. As a more
substantial innovation, we introduce a modulo game which awards the winner
immunity to punishments. This is substantial as it yields better dynamic prop-
erties: it can easily be seen that the best reply dynamics (is likely to) produces
4If w (or kw) could choose any reference allocation z ∈ Z, he would propose a division
w h e r e b yo n l yo n es h a r ei sd i ﬀerent than zero, allocating it to himself with an opportune
permutation. All players would then prefer to be winners (or kw), so there would be no pure
strategy equilibrium.
8cycles in Divide and Permute, while in our mechanism it yields convergence.
More details are in Section 4.
We have the following
Lemma 1 Game form ΓEF fully implements the EF correspondence in pure
Nash equilibria, that is:
i) s ∈ pNE ⇒ h(s) ∈ EF
ii) z ∈ EF ⇒∃ s ∈ pNE : h(s)=z.
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ EF,s u p p o s es ∈ pNE, h(s)=z.I tm u s tt h e nb e
t h ec a s et h a tzkw = zw. For if it were otherwise, any j 6= w could conveniently
deviate by playing a) nj :
P
i ni
modN = w = j;b )kj = j +1 ;c )aπj that
gives him a non-zero share (which exists in zj+1 because the zis are partitions
of ω). As a consequence, the range of shares that each player can reach by
deviating contains ρ = {zw
i }i=1..N. Then, if ui (s) is the utility that i receives
from share s, in equilibrium it must be hi =a r gm a x
r ui (zw
r ) ∀i. Hence, the
outcome hi = zw
πN◦..◦π2◦π1(i) is envy-free.
To prove EF ⇒ pNE suppose z ∈ EF. The strategy proﬁle s∗ : si =
(z,id,1,1),w i t hid the identity permutation, gives division z.P r o ﬁle s∗ is also
a pNE:i nf a c t :i )f a c i n gs∗−i, the range of shares attainable by i is {z1...zN};
ii) because z ∈ EF,p r o ﬁle s∗ allocates to each player his preferred shared in
this range. That is, s∗ is a proﬁle of mutual best replies.
3.2 Pareto optimality: ΓPO
We now present a game that implements PO + allocations, that is Pareto op-
timal allocations where nobody receives a zero share. PO + allocations are
clearly a superset of fair allocations, and some of them may generate envy.
We don’t worry about these latter, though, as they will be ruled out by ΓEF,
so we are not interested in their implementation. Again, we ﬁr s td e s c r i b et h e
mechanism informally, giving it a ﬂavour of a sequential game to illustrate its
logic.
The key to optimality is that every Nash outcome will be a competitive
equilibrium for some appropriate price vector. Welfare-theorem arguments
9then ensure Pareto eﬃciency. A little more in detail, each player i makes a
proposal, i.e. suggests an allocation/price vector di =( zi,p i).T h em e c h a n i s m
selects one particular such d (we say in a moment how this is done). The
selected proposal naturally deﬁnes N budget sets Bi, i =1 ..N,o n ef o re a c h
player. The game is built in such a way that each player i c a no b t a i nh i s
favourite share within Bi. Thus, in equilibrium all i maximize within Bi, i.e.
a competitive equilibrium results. Like in ΓEF, two elements are essential in
the construction: a) which proposal is selected? b) how can players choose
their preferred shares? As for a), each player names an integer to be used in a
modulo game. Also, each i indicates another player. The selected d is the one
suggested by the player named by w, the winner of the modulo game. As for
b), each player i calls a "reservation share" zi, which he does receive if both: i)




instead w claims for himself a share zi / ∈ Bw
¡
dkw¢
, he’s punished with a zero
share. As for the loosers of the modulo game, they receive what is prescribed
for them by dkw, but only if player kw’s proposal accomodates both i) w’s
proposal dw and ii) claim zw; otherwise, they are punished with a zero share.
The reason of the ﬁrst punishment is clear: were the winner unrestrained,
every i would try to be winner and there would be no equilibrium. The reason
for the second punishment (on the loosers of the modulo game) will become
apparent in the proof of Lemma 2.5
To formally describe the game we need more notation. Deﬁne D as the set
of allocation-price proposals whereby every i gets a non-zero bundle:
D =
©














We can now describe the mechanism:
Game form ΓPO is hS,hi :
Si = D × Zi × N × (N − 1) ∀i so si =( ( pi,zi),zi,n i,ki).
5We might impose such punishment on kw only. Lemma 2 and all subsequent results
would still hold, but the deﬁnition of the outcome functions would take one extra line.
10h : S → Z is deﬁned for the winner and the loosers as:
hw =
(












Lemma 2 Game form ΓPO fully implements PO + partitions in pNE,t h a ti s :
i) s ∈ pNE ⇒ h(s) ∈ PO +
ii) z ∈ PO + ⇒∃ s ∈ pNE : h(s)=z.
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ PO+ we show that, in equilibrium, each i is getting
his favourite share within his budget balance Bi (and these Bisa r ed e ﬁned
by a unique allocation and price vector). First observe that in equilibrium
there is no i : hi =0(any i c a nw i nt h em o d u l og a m ei no r d e rt op i c ka
particular dk and any share zi ∈ Bi
¡
dk¢
). Thus, dkw = dw and hi = zw
i ∀i.
As a consequence, the range of allocations over which any i is maximizing in
equilibrium is ρi = {0}∪j6=iBi
¡
dk¢
. Because at least two players are making the
same suggestion (dkw = dw), we have Bi
¡
dkw¢
⊆ ρi ∀i. Thus, a Nash outcome
a fortiori maximises ui within Bi
¡
dkw¢
∀i. As a consequence, hi = zkw
i ∀i is
a competitive equilibrium with prices pkw and initial endowments zkw
i ∀i (and
zero-trade).
To prove z ∈ PO + ⇒∃ s ∈ pNE : h(s)=z, suppose z ∈ PO +.B y
the second welfare theorem, there is a price vector p that supports z as a
competitive equilibrium. The strategy proﬁle s∗ : si =( z,p,1)∀i yields z and
is a pNE. To see this latter fact, note that the range of allocations reachable
for i is {0} ∪ Bi (z,p); because z∗ is assumed to be a competitive equilibrium,
every person optimizes within his budget, i.e. s∗ is a proﬁle of reciprocal best
replies.
Note the role of the punishments on the loosers. We cannot allow the
winner to name himself as proposer of d -otherwise any i would try to be
winner so there would be no equilibrium. Thus, we assign to i a range of
attainable shares ρi = {0}∪k6=iBi
¡
dk¢
. Then, if there were equilibria in which
all proposals are diﬀerent, there would not exist a single d : Bi (d) ⊆ ρi ∀i.A s
11a consequence, players would not be maximizing within a collection {Bi (d)}i
deﬁned by a unique price vector/endowments, as in a competitive equilibrium.
Introducing a punishment when dkw 6= dw, we force the.existence of at least two
identical proposals, which in turn ensures that such a {Bi (d)}i does exist. On
the other hand, punishing the case zw 6= zkw
w is the simplest way to respect a
physical constraint. Infact: in our construction dkw must become the "reference
proposal"; now, if we are to give zw to the winner we can distribute zkw
i to all
loosers i only if zw = zkw




w ). Thus we must avoid
zw 6= zkw
w ; the simplest means to this is a punishment like the one above.
Finally: we could simplify the game eliminating the reservation proposal
zi.P l a y e rw c o u l db ea l l o w e dt or e c e i v ea n yzw ∈ Bw (.) by naming it in his dw,
instead of indicating it separately as "reservation share". The loosers would
then be punished if dkw 6= dw. A reservation proposal however makes it easier
to prove the dynamic properties shown later on.
Af e wr e m a r k sp u tΓPO in relation with Thomson (2005). The idea of
reaching eﬃciency via a competitive equilibrium is borrowed from there. How-
ever, like for ΓEF, we have a game with equal strategy spaces to ensure an
(ex-ante) equal treatment of players. Other radical changes are introduced to
obtain better dynamic properties (it is easy to show that Thomson’s eﬃciency
game is likely to cycle for the best reply dynamics).
3.3 Fairness: ΓF
The following mechanism combines elements of ΓEF and ΓPO to fully imple-
ments fair divisions. As in the previous games, a fair allocation emerges as a
proposal made by (at least) two players. More in detail, each player: i) names
ap r o p o s a ldi and a reservation share zi, ii) names an integer n ∈ N,,i i i )
indicates another proposal ki, iv) chooses a permutation πi. The winner of
the modulo selects one proposal, to be taken as reference allocation (proposal




o r ,i fh ep r e f e r s ,a n ys h a r ea p p e a r i n gi nzkw.6 As in ΓPO,w ef o r c e
6In equilibrium, w’s best share in Bw will be already present in zkw
, and is reached via
permutations.
12dkw = dw in equilibrium by punishing the loosers if this is not the case. As a
result, players maximize within a family of budget balances deﬁned by a unique
price vector, so the reference allocation zkw is eﬃcient. Permutations then en-
sure that each player can reach any share in zkw, thus ensuring envy-freeness.
A formal description follows.
Game form ΓF is hS,hi :
Si = D × Zi × N × (N − 1) × Π ∀i so si =( ( pi,zi),zi,n i,ki,πi).
h : S → Z is deﬁned for the winner and the loosers as:
hw =
(
zw if zw ∈ Bw
¡
dkw¢







πN◦..◦π2◦π1(i) if dkw = dw
0 otherwise
(the loosers)
Recalling Lemma 1) and Lemma 2), the following is simply shown:
Proposition 1 Game form ΓF fully implements F partitions in pNE.
Proof. To prove pNE ⇒ F,o b s e r v eﬁr s tt h a ti napNE it must be dkw = dw
so that hi = zw
πN◦..◦π2◦π1(i)∀i. For if it were otherwise, kw would be better oﬀ
by playing dkw = dw (all other players too would rather deviate, to win the
modulo game and choose opportune strategies). Also, because any player can
be winner and receive zw ∈ Bw
¡
dkw¢
, in equilibrium it must be the case that




Bi (dj) ⊇ Bi
¡
dkw¢
.T h u s ,




i.e. is eﬃcient. Also, thanks to the permutations, hi = zw
πN◦..◦π2◦π1(i) maximizes
ui over {zkw
j }j=1..N for each i, i.e. it’s envy-free.
As for the reverse inplication, consider a particular z ∈ F.B e i n gz ∈ PO+,
there is a positive price vector p that sustain it as a competitive equilibrium.
Then, it is immediate that strategies si =( z,p,zi,1,1,id) are a pNE producing
outcome z.
We now turn to the simplicity properties by Saijo et al (1996) cited in the
Introduction. It’s immediately checked that ΓF respects balancedness, best
response and ﬁnite-dimension of strategy spaces. Forthrightedness requires
that in equilibrium each player receives what he suggests. Thus, this property
13is satisﬁed by our game up to a permutation at worst (for any fair z,t h e r e
is a forthrighted equilibrium where each i announces z plus the null permu-
tation). Apart from Thomson (2005), the other "simple" game to implement
fair divisions (see Introduction) is in Saijo et al.(1999). There, players only
announce two quantities and prices. Our mechanism may seem less simple be-
cause it require players to suggest: i) full allocations, which is more than two
bundles plus ii) additional elements like permutations and integers. However
two objections should be raised: a) if the only requirements on the outcome
function are feasibility, best response and forthrightedness, then our games are
no more complex than Saijo et al.(1999)’s: m-dimensional strategies can be
summarized into n-dimensional messages (n<m ) by means of space-ﬁlling
curves. b) if, on the other hand, we care about additional aspects of "sim-
plicity", then our mechanism is arguably simpler than Saijo et al.(1999)’s. In
particular, best replies can be immediately computed for our games, while they
involve complex computations in Saijo et al.(1999). This is a crucial advantage
when studying the dynamic properties of the mechanism.
4 Dynamic implementation
As argued in the Introduction, bare implementation is somewhat unsatisfac-
tory for our problem: given the (necessary) multiplicity of equilibria of a mech-
anism, it is not clear if/how any of them can be coordinated upon. This is not
a problem for game form ΓF though, because its equilibria can be "learned".
More precisely: a perturbed version oft h eb e s tr e p l yd y n a m i c sc o n v e r g e st o
the set of ε-equilibria with probability one. In turn, ε-equilibrium outcomes are
"ε-fair" in a sense to be clariﬁed soon. The necessity to consider ε-equilibria
(and ε-fair outcomes) will become apparent in due course.













] − ε ∀s
i ∈ S
i}
Accordingly, we deﬁne BR0 (.)=BR(.) the set of pure best replies.7 With
7The fact we consider pure strategies only is not a limitation, as we show later on.
14this notation, the set of ε-equilibria is
NEε = {s : s
i ∈ BRε(s
−i) ∀i}
As anticipated, we will obtain convergence to ε-equilibria. What are then the
fairness properties of the corresponding outcomes? We have the following
Lemma 3 ε-equilibrium outcomes of ΓF belong to the following set Fε of "ε-
fair" allocations:
Fε = {z ∈ Z :[/ ∃z
0 ∈ Z : ui (z
0
i) ≥ ui (zi)+ε ∀i] ∧ [ui (zi) ≥ ui (zj) − ε ∀i,j]}
Observe that Fε can rightly be said the set of "ε-fair" allocations because
there: i) no gain is possible for everyone, that exceeds ε; ii) no individual is
more than ε-envious. Also, Also, the set Fε evidently shrinks to F as ε →
0. Reminding the proof of Proposition 1, establishing the above Lemma is
immediate:
Proof. If z is an ε-equilibrium outcome then ui (zi) ≥ ui (zj)−ε∀i,j (evident
because i can get j’s share via permutations). On the other hand, suppose
∃z0 : ui (z0
i) ≥ ui (zi)+ε ∀i. Because each i c a no b t a i na n ys h a r ei nBi (z,p),
it is pz0
i >p z i ∀i.S u m m i n go v e ri we get pω = pz0 >p z= pω.
We introduce a last assumption; we comment it along the dynamics:
A1) the set of possible proposals D = {..,d,..} is ﬁnite and




s1 (t),s 2 (t)..,sN (t)
¢
the strategy proﬁle played at time t.T o
save notation, we use BR(s−i (t)) or BRi (t) interchangeably, or even BR(t)
when there is no doubt about index i. Consider then the following discrete-
time adjustment process:
D1) At each t, with probability pi ∈ (0,1) player i updates his strategy;
D2) When i updates at t,
i) if si (t − 1) ∈ BRε(t − 1) then si(t)=si (t − 1)
ii) otherwise, any si ∈ BR(t − 1) is played with prob.> 0.
15In words: at each time t, a random draw with probability pi decides whether
player i can update his strategy (the only constraint imposed on pi is that it
be uniformly bounded in time within (0,1)). When the random draw gives to
i the possibility to update at t,p l a y e ri chooses any best reply to the observed
action proﬁle s−i (t − 1); however, he does not change his strategy if this turns
o u tt ob ea l r e a d ya nε-best reply. Note that under A1) the set BRi (.) is ﬁnite
(because ﬁnite is Si), thus D2 ii) is legitimate.
The set of rest points is
RP = {s : prob(s(t +1 )=s | s(t)=s)=1 }
It should be clear that the set of rest points coincides with that of ε-Nash
equilibria: RP = NEε.W ew i l lp r o v et h a tRP is also an attractor.
We now comment on D2) and A1). An equilibrium is reached when an
equilibrium allocation (within an appropriate proposal d) is suggested. In
turn, by implementation only fair allocations can appear in equilibrium. Now,
because new proposals are put forward randomly (by D2 ii), if players update
strategies whenever they have an improving deviation (instead of an at least
ε-improving one), an equilibrium would never emerge: the set F has a zero
measure in Z so fair proposals are too "rare" to be hit by our players. We have
t w ow a y so u t :e i t h e rw ee n s u r es o m ef o r mo fm o n o t o n i c i t y( w h i c ha m o u n t st o
new assumptions on the adustment process), or we give the target equilibrium
set some mass. We choose the second way, and we do this considering Fε,
the set of ε-Nash outcomes. As we discussed above, it is appropriate to label
Fε the set of ε-Nash outcomes, because these latter are "ε-fair". The reason
to introduce A1) is essentially the same motivating D2). In equilibrium we
need w and kw t om a k et h es a m ep r o p o s a ld.T h u s ,i fdsw e r ed r a w nf r o ma n
inﬁnite pool, no particular d could be agreed upon. The ﬁniteness assumption
could be disposed of if players had some preference for agreeing. To keep
the assumptions on dynamics simple and general we prefer to introduce A1)
-which seems quite reasonable anyway. Finally, note that A1) does not make
D2) redundant. Infact, if we insisted on fairness (instead of ε-fairness) we
would run into the problem that there exist no ﬁnite set of allocations that
includes a fair one whatever the preference proﬁle, while this is what is needed
16for implementation.
Finally, we put D1) and D2) in relation with the literature. D1) allows any
number of players to update at t;ad i ﬀerent assumption appears for example
in Kim and Sobel (1995), where updating is sequential (assumption I). As it
will be clear from the proof of Proposition 2, we only require that sequential
updating be possible.A sf o rD2),i td o e snot rules out the adoption of non-
best replies. Similar formulations appear in Cabrales (1999), who allows for
less-than-ε-improving updatings, but assumes that a non-improving strategy
is never adopted (assumption Y3). It can be noted that there too it was
necessary to consider ε-equilibria to obtain sure convergence.
4.2 Convergence to fair divisions
The focus of this work is on fair divisions. Although similar claims can be
proven for game forms ΓEF and ΓPO, we only give the main result about ΓF.
Proposition 2 Under A1, D1 and D2, mechanism ΓF is such that
∀s(0),p r o b [s(t) ∈ RP] → 1 as t →∞ .
In words: whatever the starting point, sooner or later the process stops.
Also, because RP = NEε the limit allocation are in the set of "ε-fair" divisions.
The intuition behind convergence is simple. For any s−i and any division z,
there is a best reply whereby z is suggested (the winner’s payoﬀ is not aﬀected
by his own d). Thus, if the updating process goes on for a suﬃciently long time,
an ε-fair division (perhaps up to permutations) will eventually be suggested.
At this point, provided that some conditions hold on current proposals, no
player will gain from upsetting z as reference division. Instead, it will be
suﬃc i e n tt h a tp e r m u t a t i o n sa r ea d j u s t e du n t i lt h es h a r e sa r ea l l o c a t e dw i t h o u t
envy. The resulting strategies will be an ε-equilibrium, so a rest point. The
following proof puts this in formal terms.
Proof. of Proposition 2
The winner’s payoﬀ does not depend on his own d. On the other hand,
the winner’s range of attainable shares is the largest. Thus, it is always a best
r e p l yt ow i nt h em o d u l og a m ea n dm a k eanew proposal d. As a consequence,
17any proﬁle of proposals {di}i=1..N in DN will emerge before some time t,w i t h
probability tending to 1 as t →∞ . In particular, a proﬁle d∗ will be put
forward containing a z∗ such that
i) ∀i,j it is ui (z∗
i)+ε ≥ ui (z0) ∀z0 ∈ Bi (dj);
ii) if ui(zr
j)+ε ≥ ui(z∗
i) for some i,j,r then there is no ki = r.
By assumption A1, proposals under i)-ii) do exist in DN:a n y{(z,p),(z,p),..,(z,p)},
with z ∈ Fε and p an appropriate supporting price vector satisﬁes i)-iii) inde-
pendently of the played strategies.8
Condition i) ensures that, if d∗ has emerged, there is no advantage for
the winner to select a diﬀerent proposal dj -by so doing, he could reach some
z0 ∈ Bi (dj). On the other hand, ii) says that if division zr 6= z∗ is more
attractive for i than z∗ (because it contains a certain share zr
j), then zr cannot
become a reference division, because no one named player r (if player k had
named player r, i could make k win to have zr adopted as reference allocation).
Once d∗ i sp u tf o r w a r d ,i ti ss u ﬃcient that the next updater chooses di =
di∗and πi : πN ◦ ...πi ◦ ... ◦ π1(.)=id, and the outcome is z∗. Conditions i)-ii)
ensure that the resulting strategy proﬁle is a ε-Nash equilibrium (infact, no
player, has a convenient deviation, because z∗
i is the best share for each i,i n
the range of attainable shares). As a consequence the given strategy proﬁle is
a rest point.
Remark 1 (Mixed Strategies) Our games yield full implementation in pure-
strategy equilibria. However, implementation fails when mixed strategy equilib-
ria are used. This is a fact known to happen in many classic implementation
mechanisms. Consider for example ΓEF and the case of two players. The strat-
egy proﬁle where each player: i) assigns everything to one share, ii) randomly
choose between the swap and the id permutation with probability 1
2, is clearly a
NE. However, its outcome is non-EF with probability 1
2.I fw el o o ka tt h ed y -
namics though, we still ﬁnd that the limit outcomes are fair. The reason is sim-
ple. Proposition 2) shows that a rest point does emerge; then, because players
8There might exist others such ds, too. We don’t go into details, but it is clear that the
ﬁner is the grid of possible allocation/prices, the more likely it is that there will be many
such proposals, making convergence faster.




then each σi must be a best reply against each action proﬁle in the support of σ
itself. It follows that any realized outcome from a rest point is an equilibrium
outcome, which is fair by implementation.
5 Conclusions
The focus of this paper is on a classic fair division problem: allocating homo-
geneous divisible goods among players, in a way that is both envy-free and
eﬃcient. While the existence of these divisions is a well established fact, the
implementation side of the problem has been less thoroughly studied.
This paper gives a procedure with the following properties: a) the procedure
is a formally deﬁned game form; we look at its Nash equilibria; b) strategy
spaces are symmetric and relatively simple: essentially players are requested
to announce division proposals and price vectors. Quite straightforward is
also the outcome function: best replies are immediately calculated for any
strategy proﬁle. Most importantly c) the equilibria are learned by players who
update their strategies according to best-reply dynamics. Features a) and b)
partly appear in Thomson (2005), to which this paper is inspired. Feature c)
is new and, I suggest, important for a mechanism to be meaningful solution
to an applied implementation problem, especially in the presence of multiple
equilibria.
The mechanisms presented here are tailored to a speciﬁc kind of dynamics.
Although some rationality is embodied in the concept of Nash equilibrium,
the considered dynamics are deﬁnitely myopic. Thus, one might doubt that
players choose at t best replies to t − 1 observed actions. For example, if
the shares are given out only when a rest point is reached, why should we
exclude that a Nash equilibrium is deviated from? Even if a deviation from a
NE is not immediately convenient, it might trigger further deviations by other
players, so the ﬁnal result might be a net gain for the ﬁrst deviator. Similarly,
one might be interested in looking at coalitional equilibrium concepts. These
considerations evidently lead away from the Nash equilibrium concept.
In keeping with the classic implementation theory, this paper concentrates
19on Nash equilibria, and in particular on pure-strategy equilibria. However,
mixed strategy equilibria as well are taken care of. In particular, mixed strate-
gies with (random) non-fair outcomes cannot be rest point; this result descends
directly from the assumptions on dynamics. If we do not accept such speciﬁ-
cation of dynamics, mixed strategy could become relevant again either when
i) players observe mixed strategies -which would not be very realistic either,
or when ii) players form complex beliefs about their opponents’ strategies. In
the latter case, we should again abandon Nash implementation, and look at
appropriately deﬁned sequential equilibria.
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